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Abstract
Important variations in access to health care and
health outcomes are associated with geography, giving
rise to profound ethical concerns. This paper discusses
the consequences of such concerns for the allocation of
health care finance to geographical regions.
Specifically, it examines the ethical drivers underlying
capitation systems, which have become the principal
method of allocating health care finance to regions in
most countries. Although most capitation systems are
based on empirical models of health care expenditure,
there is much debate about which needs factors to
include in (or exclude from) such models. This concern
with legitimate and illegitimate drivers of health care
expenditure reflects the ethical concerns underlying the
geographical distribution of health care finance.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:256–261)
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Introduction
Among the many objectives set for health care sys-
tems by policy-makers, the pursuit of concepts such
as equal access to health care, or equal health out-
comes, frequently play an important role. The
prominence of such objectives suggests that a con-
cern with equity is an important element of the
ethical bases underlying the design of health care
systems. The examples of equal access and equal
outcomes reflect, respectively, the classic Aristote-
lian principles of horizontal and vertical equity in
respect of health care. A concern with equal access
suggests equal treatment of equals (horizontal
equity), whilst a concern with equal health outcome
suggests that those who are diVerent in relevant
respects (such as life expectancy) should in some
sense be treated proportionately diVerently (verti-
cal equity).
In making either of these principles operational,
geography becomes important for three reasons.
First, many systems of health care are organised on
a geographical basis. Issues of territorial equity
therefore become central to the distribution of
health care resources. Second, whatever system of
health care is in place, health care facilities such as
hospitals and clinics are concentrated at specific
locations, implying that geographical considera-
tions may be of central importance in determining
access to health care and health outcomes. Third,
there is considerable evidence that geographical
inequalities in health, in the form of “area eVects”,
may exist beyond social class and income inequali-
ties.
In this paper we discuss the ethical issues that
arise when a citizen’s health care insurance
arrangements are based purely on area of residence.
The central issue we address is how to reflect ethi-
cal principles in the allocation of health care finance
to geographical areas. In order to address this
problem we must first summarise the principal
geographical influences on health and health care
utilisation (section 2). In section 3 we examine the
principles that link notions of geographical equity
to health care finance. Section 4 examines the ethi-
cal drivers underlying methods of allocating health
care finance geographically. Some brief conclusions
are given in section 5.
Geography, health and health care
Geographical considerations play a crucial role in
influencing health.1 Geography may directly aVect
an individual’s health status, through environment
or less tangible geographical eVects such as an
area’s social capital; geography may play an impor-
tant role in the nature of health care delivered,
through historical and cultural inheritances and
regional price variations; and the geographical dis-
tribution of health care facilities may aVect utilisa-
tion, through diVerential opportunity of access to
services. These are considered in turn.
AREA EFFECTS ON HEALTH
There are several plausible area eVects on an indi-
vidual’s health. Most obviously, the physical
environment might be an important determinant of
health variations. The impact on health of varia-
tions in local economic conditions, such as the
dominant type of employment, might also create an
important area eVect. Inadequacies in social
support systems, such as transport, social care and
education services, might have adverse implications
for local health outcomes. Less tangibly, local
culture might aVect lifestyle in numerous ways
(such as diet and smoking), giving rise to an appar-
ent area eVect on health. Interest in reducing area
health inequalities is likely to stimulate a geographi-
cal policy response (such as the “health action
zones” implemented in England).
AREA EFFECTS ON HEALTH CARE PRODUCTION
Input prices can vary substantially between areas.
This aVects the aggregate level of finance required
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to deliver a standard level of health care. However,
it might also have an important influence on the
way that health care is organised. For example,
rural and urban areas present quite diVerent
challenges for the optimal design of health services.
Given increasing returns to scale, it becomes more
costly to deliver the same level of hospital care to
rural areas as in urban areas. Rural areas may
therefore not secure the economies of scale
obtained in urban areas, and might be oVered extra
finance in order to continue to provide a standard
level of care (for example, in the form of small hos-
pitals). However, all systems of health care
recognise that–once rurality exceeds a certain
level–it becomes impractical to deliver the same
services as are enjoyed in urban areas. So very rural
communities may suVer a lower level of services
than their urban counterparts, may have to travel
further to secure such services, or may receive
health care in a diVerent manner (for example
through greater use of telemedicine).2 The issue of
rurality exemplifies the trade-oV that exists between
equity and eYciency in the allocation of health care
resources. The pursuit of eYciency, in the sense of
equalising the marginal cost of a unit of health gain,
must be moderated by equity considerations.3
AREA EFFECTS ON HEALTH CARE UTILISATION
There is strong evidence to suggest that geographi-
cal access to services has a profound eVect on
health care utilisation.4 Such eVects might take the
form of “supplier induced demand”, in the sense
that, in areas with relatively high provision of health
care, individuals might be “induced” to make more
use of services than their counterparts in less well
provided areas. Conversely, areas with low levels of
provision might exhibit “supplier suppressed de-
mand”. Further, there also may be important area-
wide cultural influences on the use of health
services that might, for example, influence a
threshold of ill health below which individuals
choose not to seek medical intervention. The extent
to which the system of health care finance should
seek to address such inequalities will be heavily
influenced by equity objectives.5
There is substantial evidence that area eVects are
important. For example–after every attempt is
made to account for measurable diVerences in
clinical need–rural areas exhibit lower levels of hos-
pital utilisation and have poorer health outcomes
than their urban counterparts.6 7 Such geographical
disparities might arise from any or all of the three
sources noted above. If they give rise to ethical con-
cern, the geographical allocation of health care
finance becomes a central instrument for making
an appropriate adjustment to health care resource
levels.
Geographical equity in health care
finance
Outside of the United States, with its uniquely plu-
ralistic tradition, systems of health care finance in
the developed world can be considered under four
broad headings: managed competition between
competing insurers (as, for example, in Belgium,
the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland); com-
pulsory social insurance based on sector of
employment (as in France, Japan and Austria);
centralised public systems of insurance, with
accountability usually devolved to local manage-
ment boards (as in the United Kingdom, New Zea-
land and many states in Australia and Canada), and
devolved public sector systems of insurance, in
which local governments assume responsibility for
organising health care (as in Scandinavia, Spain
and Italy).
Geography is a key element in the organisation of
many of these systems of finance, most obviously
those within the public sector, in which the pursuit
of some concept of territorial equity is often a cen-
tral policy objective.
In this section, we examine the two principal
ethical issues that arise when health care is
organised geographically: namely, who is to pay for
the health care system, and to what extent should
the level of financial resources be allowed to vary
between areas. We assume an individual is compul-
sorily placed in an insurance risk pool comprising
all citizens living in the defined administrative area,
that may be a large region with many millions of
inhabitants, or a small municipality. The risk pool is
responsible for financing and purchasing all rel-
evant health care for its members.
Suppose first that there exists a national “stand-
ard” package of health care, that all area risk pools
seek to oVer. The chosen package implies a certain
level of expected expenditure for every individual,
which we term his or her “spending need”. This
will of course depend on the individual’s personal
characteristics, such as age, but will usually
presume a uniform level of eYciency and service
quality on the part of the health service. The
personal characteristics to be taken into account in
calculating the expected expenditure on an indi-
vidual will in some part be determined by society’s
ethical preferences, as discussed further in section
4. Because individuals diVer in their health care
needs, so in general do local areas. We can define
the health care expenditure needs of a region as the
expected costs of delivering the standard package of
care given the personal characteristics of its
citizens, assuming a given level of productive
eYciency.
We first assume that the costs of delivering the
standard package of care must be borne in their
entirety by the local area, and that the sole source of
revenue is a local tax-base. The tax-base might be
property values if revenue is raised from local prop-
erty taxation, or local employment income if raised
from a payroll tax. Then, assuming no revenue from
any other source, the local health care tax rate (or
insurance premium rate) is given by the ratio of
health care costs to the size of the tax-base. In gen-
eral, therefore, the costs to identical citizens living
in diVerent areas of insuring a standard package of
health care will vary substantially depending on (a)
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the population health care needs and (b) the
revenue-base of the areas in which they live.
An alternative extreme arrangement would be
that a uniform premium rate must be charged in all
areas, and areas must then deliver some package of
health care within the revenue this generates. The
revenue available to an area will then depend solely
on the size of its tax-base, with no reference to
health care needs. The area will therefore either
have to oVer an inferior package of care when
standard expenditure needs exceed revenue, or be
able to oVer superior health care when revenue
exceeds standard needs. Arrangements such as
these, in which each area-based risk pool depends
purely on its own resources, can be thought of as a
system of pure risk-fragmentation between areas.
Ability to pay
The implied variations in insurance premiums and
health care packages brought about by pure
risk-fragmentation has almost universally been
considered unacceptable on ethical grounds. In
general it would lead to areas with high health care
needs and poor revenue-bases oVering more
restricted health care, higher copayments (whereby
the insured person pays a contribution towards the
supplier’s charges) or higher premiums than their
healthier, richer counterparts. Almost all geo-
graphically based systems of health care therefore
have implicit or explicit objectives that reflect hori-
zontal and vertical equity concerns relating to the
geographical distribution of resources.8
It is less common to encounter explicit objectives
relating to the financial contribution to health care
made by regions. However, they exist implicitly, in
the sense that almost all societies insist that
individuals’ contributions to health care funding
should be mainly according to ability to pay, rather
than benefits received. This principle rules out
direct charges to the users of health care as a major
source of finance. In this paper, we are interested in
the extent to which, after taking account of all other
relevant factors such as income and wealth,
payment for health care varies according to where a
citizen lives.
In centralised public health care systems, funded
by national taxation, geographical variation in pay-
ment is eliminated by applying national rates of
taxation to all local tax-bases. More interesting is
the case where some discretion in local tax rates is
permitted, as in the devolved system of health care
used in Scandinavian local government. Here the
ethical principles relating to health care must be
integrated with the principle of local freedom
intrinsic to local government.9 Under these ar-
rangements, a concept of equal access (for equal
need) may need to be amended to one of equal
opportunity for localities to deliver a standard pack-
age of care at a standard premium. Local areas may
then have the freedom collectively to vary some
elements of the package of care and premium
rate.10–12 If a locality chooses to vary the package, the
usual arrangement is that the entire burden of any
extra expenditure falls on the locality, in the form of
additional premium or user charges.
The principal policy instrument for securing
geographical equity objectives has been the devel-
opment of various revenue sharing schemes, which
seek to compensate risk pools for variations in
health care needs and resource bases. If the policy
objective is to secure an identical rate of premium
for all areas, the usual procedure is to apply some
national standard premium rate to each local
tax-base. The diVerence between the notional rev-
enue this yields and the area’s assessed spending
needs is the contribution of the area to the
revenue-sharing pool (which becomes a receipt if
spending needs exceed the notional revenue). For a
self-funding system of health care, the sum of all
receipts must equal the sum of contributions to the
revenue-sharing pool. In centralised systems, rev-
enue comes from national or state-wide sources,
such as general taxation. Under these circum-
stances, there is no need to seek to equalise
insurance payments, as these form part of the
national tax structure and are therefore already
equalised. The policy problem is therefore to
develop estimates of local spending needs, that then
form the basis for financial allocations to localities
without reference to local tax-bases.
If necessary, an area’s revenue-base is usually
readily observed. The principal technical diYculty
in implementing revenue-sharing schemes is there-
fore the estimation of an area’s health care spending
needs. In attempting to address this issue, numer-
ous risk adjustment schemes have been developed.8
We summarise work in this area in the next section.
Before doing so, it is important to note that, in
addition to equity arguments, there may be impor-
tant arguments relating to political solidarity for
seeking to equalise health care packages and
premium rates. For example, inferior local packages
of public sector health care may induce richer,
healthier individuals to resort to private insurance,
thereby possibly diluting their commitment to con-
tinue contributing to a public sector system from
which they enjoy no benefits. The public funding of
the health care system may become unviable. Simi-
larly, to avoid subsidising the poor and the sick, the
rich and healthy may flee more deprived areas,
leaving behind a tax-base that cannot support an
acceptable system of health care in the absence of
any revenue sharing.
Heterogeneity
On the other hand, there are those who may argue
that the heterogeneity between areas implicit in a
system of pure risk-fragmentation is not a cause for
concern. The Tiebout model of local government13
suggests that citizens might migrate to the locality
most closely oVering their preferred mix of health
care, insurance premium and housing costs, and
that no transfers between localities are required.
For example, if premium revenues are raised from a
local tax-base, high levels of local premiums (or
inferior local health care) might be reflected in
lower property values. Some or all of a deprived
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area’s disadvantage may therefore be compensated
in the form of lower housing costs.14 In practice, the
influence of such extreme laissez faire approaches
has been minimal outside the United States.
Calculating spending needs
In most systems of health care, health care
expenditure needs are estimated through the use of
capitation payments. A capitation payment is defined
as the amount of prospective health care finance
attached to an individual for a specified period of
time. Most systems employ some form of risk
adjustment that seeks to vary capitation payments
on the basis of individual characteristics, reflecting
expenditure needs.
There is an enormous range of determinants of
expected health care expenditure for an individual.
These include the individual’s social and environ-
mental circumstances as well as health status.
There may also be important structural reasons
(such as remoteness and language barriers) that
lead to higher costs in some areas than in others.
Such factors should in principle be taken into
account when designing a capitation system. In
practice, the extent to which this is possible has
been severely constrained by data availability and
methodological limitations.8 Moreover there may
be some determinants of expenditure on an
individual that a capitation system should not take
into account. For example, many systems of health
care do not compensate purchasers for variations in
clinical practice from some assumed norm.
This implies that–from a capitation perspective–
determinants of expenditure on an individual can
be divided into the legitimate (which the scheme
should take into account) and the illegitimate
(which the scheme should not take into account).
The criteria for deciding whether a determinant is
legitimate or not should in principle be based on
the ethical framework underlying the health care
system.
Almost all capitation schemes use empirical uti-
lisation data as the basis for risk adjustment.8 That
is, the capitation for a person with particular char-
acteristics is some estimate of average historical
expenditure on similar individuals. Such capitation
schemes are intrinsically conservative. They implic-
itly assume that the average level of care as histori-
cally delivered to each type of person equates to the
desired package of health care. This conservatism
reflects an understandable reluctance to define
explicitly what constitutes the “standard” package
of care to be covered. Instead, policy is developed
on the assumption that whatever is currently on
average delivered by the health care system is de
facto the standard.
Use of historical spending averages takes no
account of the possibility that for some population
groups there may exist unmet health care need.
Unmet need can be defined as a diVerence between
the desired package of care and the package
actually received, and reflects systematic shortfall in
the health care expenditure allocated to certain
groups of the population. Where an equity concept
of “equal access for equal need” is employed, it
implies that certain population groups with a
particular need are denied the care oVered to the
rest of the population with that need. The
possibility of unmet need, particularly among
ethnic minorities and rural communities, has taxed
many of those seeking to develop capitation
schemes.15–18
Ethical concerns relating to unmet need for health
care can be summarised under two headings:
inequalities of access to health care, and inequalities
of outcome, which loosely correspond to concerns
about horizontal and vertical equity. Inequalities of
access suggest the existence of a population charac-
teristic that is associated with lower observed levels of
health care utilisation than the rest of the population,
other things being equal. Given society’s ethical
stance, the characteristic is not considered a
legitimate influence on health care spending, and its
existence implies horizontal inequity.
Unacceptable inequalities in health outcomes lead
to a concern with vertical inequity.19 There is a
presumption that more health care resources should
be directed at the adversely aVected population
groups. For ethical reasons, there is therefore a per-
sonal characteristic that indicates that an individual
should secure access to more health care resources
than the rest of the population, other things being
equal. The chosen characteristic represents a legiti-
mate influence on a capitation payment, and so it
should influence capitation payments.
Formidable task
Deciding whether an observed significant influence
on spending is legitimate or illegitimate is in
practice a formidable task. For example, suppose
that, after adjusting for variations in plausible
population characteristics, it is found that some
areas of a country exhibit systematically higher lev-
els of spending than others. This may be due to
illegitimate factors, such as variations in health care
supply. Or it may be due to legitimate variations,
caused by variations in needs that cannot be
captured in the available measures of population
characteristics.
As a result, the extent to which such area-based
variations in spending should be reflected in
resource allocations has much exercised policy-
makers. Approaches vary from assuming that all
unexplained area variation is illegitimate, and is
therefore removed from capitation formulae (as in
the United Kingdom)20 21 to assuming that all area
variation is legitimate. This latter approach is
adopted in US Medicare capitation payments,
which are based in the first instance on an
individual’s characteristics, such as age, sex and
morbidity diagnosis. However, the payments are
then adjusted depending on the average risk-
adjusted health care expenditure in the county of
residence.22
Geographical resource allocation is further com-
plicated by the possibility that there may be
variations in health care input prices between areas,
suggesting that the expenditure consequences of
Rice, Smith 259
www.jmedethics.com
delivering a standard package of care may vary. An
extreme example of this can be observed in England,
where it is estimated that input prices are 40% higher
in central London than in most of the rest of the
country.23 In order to preserve any concept of equity,
such variations should be accommodated within a
capitation scheme. Yet, as the US Medicare example
indicates, often little eVort is made to disentangle
legitimate price variations from illegitimate utilisa-
tion variations between areas.
It is in practice unrealistic to expect that all citi-
zens can be oVered identical levels of access to
identical modes of health care delivered at identical
standards. The ethical principle of equal treatment
for equal need is likely to be tempered by a recog-
nition that health care in (say) highly rural areas
must be qualitatively diVerent from its counterpart
in urban areas. There cannot be a general hospital
on every street corner. To some extent such
variations are formally recognised. For example,
standards for ambulance response times in England
are more relaxed in rural than urban areas.
However, the extent to which such variations are
considered legitimate for broader aspects of health
care is largely a matter of conjecture.
An interesting insight into the distinction be-
tween horizontal and vertical equity concepts is
oVered by recent developments in the English
National Health Service (NHS). For many years,
geographical resource allocation has sought to oVer
“equal opportunity of access for equal need”, sug-
gesting a concern with horizontal equity.24 In 1998,
however, the government announced an intention
to revise the resource allocation criterion to one of
“contributing to a reduction in health inequalities”,
indicating an interest in vertical as well as horizon-
tal equity. This shift implies a concern that current
patterns of health care consumption are unsatisfac-
tory, because they do not resolve unacceptable
variations in health outcome. It signals a desire to
change current patterns of spending, and so
empirical observation of existing spending patterns
is unlikely to form a useful basis for estimating
capitation payments.25
Managerial action
Avoidable health inequalities arise from three broad
sources: variations in the quality of health care
services; variations in access to services, and varia-
tions in factors outside the control of health
services, such as wealth, lifestyle and genetic and
environmental considerations. There is consider-
able evidence that many populations suVering poor
health outcomes suVer on all three counts.26
Poor quality services for disadvantaged popula-
tions are in many respects a performance manage-
ment (rather than resource allocation) issue. The
right amount of money may be being spent on such
populations, but service organisation and delivery is
unsatisfactory. The policy implication is that extra
resources are not the principal source of the prob-
lem, but rather that the quality defects should be
rectified by managerial action. Therefore, there
may be no need for any major change to the
resource allocation system.
Poor access implies that disadvantaged popula-
tions are not receiving some services to which the
remainder of the population secures access–that is,
there is horizontal inequity. This compromises the
validity of existing capitation formulae that are based
on empirical links between need and spending,
because they will not capture any unmet need. There
will therefore be a need both for supplementary
resource allocations outside the empirically based
capitation formulae and for performance manage-
ment to ensure that the extra allocations are spent on
the intended target–rectifying unmet need.
Poor life chances among disadvantaged popula-
tions pose the most fundamental challenge. If the
health care system is to tackle health inequalities
arising from this source, it must target the
vulnerable populations in a way that it has not done
hitherto. This may entail oVering such populations
preferential access to health care, in the form of
provision of services not available to other users. In
short, addressing health inequalities might require
abandonment of the principle of equal access for
equal clinical need, in favour of preferential access
for those with poorer life chances, and policy might
be to implement “positive discrimination” in favour
of deprived areas. This redirection of public sector
resources might extend well beyond health care to
embrace other public services that aVect health.
Conclusions
Implicit in the above discussion is the reality that–in
practice–matching the geographical allocation of
health care finance to ethical principles is a formi-
dable task. Equity objectives, such as securing equal
access to health care for equal need, or securing
equality of health outcome, can never be perfectly
achievable. In practice, inequalities in provision of
health care will always exist, if only because of geo-
graphical variations in the costs of reaching
services,5 and equality of health outcome can be
pursued only in part by redeployment of health
service resources. The pursuit of eYciency in
health care can be viewed as a further ethical con-
cern. Yet policy-makers often lack guidance on the
extent to which the pursuit of equity objectives
should be tempered by eYciency considerations.27
The choice of equity criterion can be used to
determine what constitute the legitimate determi-
nants of expenditure to be used in the design of
capitation payment formulae. We have nevertheless
noted the practical diYculties encountered in mak-
ing ethical principles operational. Apart from the
prosaic problem of data limitations, there is often a
methodological diYculty in disentangling legiti-
mate from illegitimate influences on expenditure
variation. A further major lacuna in seeking to
make ethical policies operational has been the
reluctance to specify what constitutes a “standard”
package of health care. The use of historical
precedent might lead to the perpetuation of serious
breaches of the ethical principles citizens wish to
see reflected in their systems of health care.
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Notwithstanding these diYculties, we nevertheless
believe that the pursuit of equity in the geographical
allocation of health care finance is an issue of
profound importance. A fairer distribution of funds
is desirable for its own sake, in maximising the value
that society secures from its investment in health
care, and less directly in securing the widespread
popular support for publicly funded health services
that is needed if they are to remain viable.
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